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Merit-Based Sentencing Reductions:
Moving Forward on Specifics, and Some
Critique of the New Model Penal Code
Rory K. Little
In the Essay that follows, Michael Santos tells a remarkable story.
Arrested at age twenty-three, Santos served twenty-six years in the federal
1
prison system. While in prison, Santos published articles and books, and
earned college and master’s degrees, despite what he describes as
2
affirmatively obstructionist decisions by “corrections” personnel.
Immediately after his release in 2013, Santos began lecturing at a respected
3
4
state university. Today, he has a website; course materials for persons
5
facing lengthy prison sentences; scores of supporters and mentors; and the
charisma and character to hold a law symposium audience spellbound for
every minute of his thirty-minute presentation. Those who teach know
how difficult that can be!

 Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco. My
thanks go to Allen Dreschel (UC Hastings ‘15) for indefatigable research assistance; Rob Taboada
(UC Hastings ‘15) for his invitation and support for the Symposium, of which this Essay is a small part;
and to Emily Goldberg Knox (UC Hastings ‘15), the Editor-in-Chief for Volume 66 of the Hastings Law
Journal, and my sometimes student, for her always stimulating yet understanding patience.
1. Michael G. Santos, About Prison (2003); Michael G. Santos, Earning Freedom:
Conquering a 45-Year Prison Term (2012); Michael G. Santos, Gangsters and Thugs:
Consequences That Hustlers Pay (2007); Michael G. Santos, Inside: Life Behind Bars in
America (2007); Michael Santos, Profiles from Prison: Adjusting to Life Behind Bars (2003);
Michael G. Santos, Triumph!: Straight-A Guide: Conquering Imprisonment and Preparing
Prisoners for Re-entry (2013); Michael G. Santos, What if I Go to Prison?: Long-Term Prisoner
Describes Criminal Justice System, Prison, and Issues to Consider When Contemplating the
Possibility of Imprisonment (2003).
2. See Michael Santos, Incentivizing Excellence: A Suggestion for Merit-Based Reductions from a
Twenty-Six-Year Prison Insider, 66 Hastings L.J.1549 (2015).
3. See Michael Santos, Fall 2013 Syllabus for Criminal Justice 451: The Architecture of
Imprisonment, S.F. State Univ., https://syllabus.sfsu.edu/syllabus/view/20134-R-11878 (last visited
Aug. 5, 2015).
4. Michael G. Santos: Earning Freedom, http://michaelsantos.com/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
5. See, e.g., Former Inmate Speaks Out Against U.S. ‘Commitment’ to Mass Incarceration, PBS
NewsHour (Apr. 2, 2014, 6:29 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/santos-former-prisoner-looks-helpothers/; Partial List of Endorsements (More Available upon Request), Michael Santos: Ensuring
Freedom, http://michaelsantos.com/endorsements/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
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But in contrast to what I think is often the unspoken reaction of
lawyers to “prisoner example speakers,” Santos ought not be viewed
simply as an object of fascination like some museum piece. He is plainly
an intelligent person, hard-working and a thinker. He is also a living
example of the mistakes—and the hopes—of America’s bureaucratized
long-term imprisonment system, popularized in recent years as “mass
6
incarceration.”
Just as significant as Santos’s “story” is his message. Santos adds his
voice of experience to an increasingly large and politically diverse chorus
that recommends various mechanisms for permitting the safe release of
7
convicted felons “early” from their imprisonment terms. Certainly this
chorus is driven by some extent to the budgetary imperatives of the
8
times. But it is also driven by people like Santos, whose crime was serious
and who may well deserve both the retributive as well as deterrent
sanction of imprisonment, but who also demonstrate, by a record of “meritbased” achievement, that some sentences initially imposed are unnecessarily
long. I would join Santos in suggesting that proposals for “interim looks”
at lengthy prison sentences be considered, as well as systems of measurable
“merit credits” toward release. And I offer some constructive criticisms of
the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) recent adoption of some steps in
this direction.

6. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Mass Incarceration on Trial: A Remarkable Court Decision
and the Future of Prisons in America (2014); Franklin E. Zimring, The Scale of Imprisonment in the
United States: Twentieth Century Patterns and Twenty-First Century Prospects, 100 J. Crim. &
Criminology 1225 (2010). The phrase “mass incarceration” is of relatively recent vintage, but
recognition of the phenomenon is not. See Sentencing Reform in Overcrowded Times: A
Comparative Perspective (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997). See generally Marc
Mauer, Race to Incarcerate (1999) (discussing three decades of prison expansion in America).
7. Thus in 2011, the ALI adopted, as part of its long-running project to revise the Model Penal
Code, three provisions that address various paths for the reduction of criminal imprisonment
sentences. Model Penal Code §§ 305.1, 305.6–305.7, reprinted in Model Penal Code: Sentencing
(Preliminary Draft No. 10, 2014) (on file with author). In a different bipartisan vein, Congress in 2010
enacted the Fair Sentencing Act, co-sponsored by Republicans and Democrats alike, which, among
other things, increased the quantities of crack cocaine that trigger federal statutory mandatory
minimum sentences. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. 2372
(2010); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2006 ed. & Supp. IV) (prior to 2010 amendment). Further, 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides that upon motion of the defendant (or the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, or on its own motion) the court may retroactively reduce the term of imprisonment for
inmates sentenced under the old guidelines. Finally, in July 2015, President Obama commuted dozens
of lengthy sentences imposed on nonviolent drug offenders. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Gardiner Harris,
Obama Issues Reductions of Sentences in Drug Cases, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2015, at A11.
8. See generally Hadar Aviram, Cheap on Crime: Recession-Era Politics and the Transformation
of American Punishment (2015).
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I. A Brief Historical Sketch of Criminal Sentencing
in the United States
Since prisons were first implemented as a more humane alternative
9
to death penalties or other physical torture, the pendulum has swung, not
in a line, but in a circle or even a sphere, among various methods for
determining how long convicted criminal offenders should be imprisoned.
This introductory Essay is hardly the place to catalogue all the ideas that
have been generated around the simple question, “how long?” But
perhaps a short historical sketch, focused primarily on recent decades, will
prove useful.
A. Judicial Sentencing Discretion Has Been a Centerpiece of U.S.
Criminal Sentencing
History has largely neglected the progressive views that our
constitutional Framers expressed in their first enactments on criminal
10
sentencing in the 1790s. As I have explained elsewhere, the Framers
confronted a world where much criminal sentencing was automatic
(“determinate”) upon conviction. Laws, or common law customs, that
provided something like, “Anyone convicted of [specific crime] shall be
9. See, e.g., Herbert A. Johnson & Nancy Travis Wolfe, History of Criminal Justice 183 (3d
ed. 2003); Paul W. Keve, Prisons and the American Conscience: A History of U.S. Federal
Corrections xi (1991). Jails of course existed previously, to hold persons accused of crime and the
convicted for short periods (before exile or execution). But lengthy prison terms were uncommon. See
id.
10. Rory K. Little & Teresa Chen, The Lost History of Apprendi and the Blakely Petition for
Rehearing, 17 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 69 (2004).
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sentenced to death,” were not uncommon at the time. Automatic
11
imprisonment terms were sometimes similarly specified. There was no
allowance for judicial sentencing discretion in that centuries-old model.
But contrary to the Supreme Court’s simplistic (and erroneous)
view, “fixed term sentences,” specifying imprisonment terms that were
automatically set upon conviction, were not uniformly endorsed by our
12
American Framers. Rather, our progressive Framers clearly envisioned
that sentencing discretion exercised by judges, within indeterminate
ranges set by the legislature, would be central to the new federal system.
Nondiscretionary, mandatory criminal sentencing may have been the
13
predominate sentencing philosophy before the Framers took over. But
in 1790, the very first Congress enacted numerous indeterminate criminal
sentencing laws, such as zero to seven years for falsifying court records or
misprision of treason, and zero to three years and a fine of zero to five
14
15
hundred dollars for misprision of felony. The fact is, the First Congress
launched the federal sentencing system into the universe of setting broad
ranges for potential criminal sentences that we have today. Just as obviously,
they expected federal judges to decide where, within legislatively specified
ranges, an individual defendant would be placed.
Fast-forwarding 180 years, America in the 1970s still uniformly
reflected the idea that the legislatures would set sentencing ranges for
crimes, and then judges would choose a sentence within that range. In
1972, however, U.S. District Judge Marvin Frankel published a path16
breaking book entitled Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order. Judge
Frankel exposed the emperor’s naked truth: judicial discretion within
indeterminate sentencing regimes appeared to operate without rationality or
fairness, and the most influential factor in determining the overall length of
sentence actually imposed was not the character of the offender or the
severity of the crime, but rather simply the identity of the judge exercising
17
the discretion.
11. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (noting a “19th-century shift in this
country from statutes providing fixed-term sentences”).
12. Little & Chen, supra note 10, at 72, 74 n.5 (citing numerous points in Apprendi asserting a
different view).
13. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479, 481.
14. Five hundred dollars in 1790 was a hefty sum, worth over $13,000 in inflation-adjusted 2015
dollars. See Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to Present,
MeasuringWorth, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (enter “1790” in Initial Year, “500”
in Amount, and “2015” in Desired Year; then look to “real price of that commodity”) (last visited
Aug. 5, 2015).
15. Little & Chen, supra note 10, at 72 (citing an Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes
Against the United States, 1 Stat. 112-119 (1790)); see also 2 Annals of Congress 1522 (1790).
16. Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (1973).
17. Id. at 6 (sentences are “depending upon the judge”); id. at 23 (“a regime of substantially
limitless discretion is by definition arbitrary, capricious, and antithetical to the rule of law”); id. at 25
(“our sentencing judgments splay wildly as results of unpredictable and numerous variables”); id. at 49
(“the unbridled power of the sentencers to be arbitrary and discriminatory”).
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Moreover, in the intervening 180 years, an additional discretionary
component had been added to the indeterminate sentencing regime the
18
Framers first endorsed: parole. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, progressive sentencing advocates developed the idea
that, in fact, some if not all criminal offenders might demonstrate, over
19
time, that they deserved not to serve the “top end” of their sentences.
The idea was that while some offenders might be compelled to serve all
twenty years of a zero-to-twenty-years sentence, a larger majority ought to
be released sooner than the end. A “rehabilitative model” came to
20
predominate in criminal sentencing, hence the “Department of
Corrections” title that was adopted by many state prison systems in the mid21
twentieth century. While society might hold a maximum twenty-year
“hammer” over the head of would-be criminals, convicted offenders could
be released well before reaching that top end if they were judged to be no
longer a danger and capable of living by society’s rules. Once “corrected,”
this philosophy averred, criminal offenders should be “paroled” into a
supervised release situation, for their own good and the good of society.
Once a concept of “parole” was accepted, another question was
quickly—if unreflectively—answered: who should exercise the discretion
to grant parole? The rationale for the answer—the executive branch—is
unclear. Why should executive branch officials, appointed by a president
or governor, be the ones to decide when prisoners should be released? If
judges had been entrusted to make the original sentencing decision, why
shouldn’t judges be similarly given the decision to parole? The answer, as
best I can determine, was based on administrative convenience. Given
that prisoners, once sentenced, were already placed into the custody of
the executive branch—prisons being an executive branch agency—the
idea seems to have immediately been adopted that the executive branch
should also decide when to release the prisoner from custody, if early.
18. See, e.g., Andrew A. Bruce et al., The Workings of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
the Parole System in Illinois: A Report to the Honorable Hinton G. Clabaugh, Chairman,
Parole Board of Illinois iv (1928) (noting that Illinois was “one of the first states, if not the first, to
enact a parole law . . . about thirty years ago”).
19. Peter B. Hoffman, U.S. Parole Comm’n, History of the Federal Parole System 23,
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/uspc/legacy/2009/10/07/history.pdf.
20. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
21. In 1912, the agency managing the California prison system was called the California State
Detentions Bureau. In 1951, it was renamed the California Department of Corrections. Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, AllGov California, http://www.allgov.com/usa/ca/departments/
independent-agencies/department_of_corrections_and_rehabilitation?agencyid=223 (last visited Aug.
5, 2015). In 2004, this agency was renamed the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
although given California’s budgetary difficulties it is difficult to find hard evidence of a true return to
rehabilitative philosophies in California prison management. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910,
1932–33 (2011) (describing how California state prisons have failed to provide basic mental health care
services to inmates); Sara Mayeux, The Unconstitutional Horrors of Prison Overcrowding, Newsweek
(Mar. 22, 2015, 2:55 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/unconstitutional-horrors-prison-overcrowding315640.
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This allocation of authority may also have felt natural because the
executive branch—the king—historically decided pardon, clemency, and
commutation issues. Yet the rationale for why the executive and not the
22
judicial seems unexamined. Perhaps a grant of release from custody,
before the maximum end of a sentence was reached, felt more like those
historically executive branch actions. But history, while providing an
explanation, is not a rationale.
In any case, parole boards were born, and they acted in an
unarticulated partnership with the original sentencing judge to set the
23
actual term that a criminal offender would serve. But the experience
24
was not always a happy one. The position of parole board member was
generally not viewed as prestigious, and the appointees were often
perceived as appointed more on the basis of patronage than merit.
Moreover, while “expertise” might be developed by parole commissioners
presiding over hundreds of cases, empirical data suggested that the choices
made—parole or no parole—were no better than if they were made
25
randomly. That is, offenders who were paroled often re-offended; and
conversely, some prisoners thought by many to deserve parole did not
26
receive it.
Thus in the 1970s and ‘80s, the pendulum swung again. It had
apparently swung too far, from determinate (legislatively directed)
sentences, to wildly and seemingly arbitrarily varying discretionary
sentences within indeterminate legislative ranges. To address this
problem, the concept of trying to “guide” or regulate judicial sentencing
discretion in individual sentences had been brewing in the states since
Judge Frankel’s book. States experimented with increasingly detailed
“guidelines” for their judges to consult before imposing a particular
27
sentence. Finally in 1984, Congress lost all patience with judicial
discretion, and enacted the Sentencing Reform Act, which would
(1) make individual sentencing subject to mandatory “guidelines,”

22. See Sarah Lucy Cooper & Daniel Gough, The Controversy of Clemency and Innocence in
America, 51 Cal. W. L. Rev. 55, 64 (2014).
23. See Bruce et al., supra note 18, at 3 (“The [Parole] Board, in the final analysis, is the real
sentencing body and to all intents and purposes acts and functions as a court.”).
24. See Frankel, supra note 16, at 47–48 (criticizing parole boards).
25. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 57 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3240, 1983 WL 25404
(“As Professor Norval Morris of the University of Chicago Law School has illustrated, parole boards
are not able to predict with any degree of certainty which prisoners are likely to be ‘good’ release risks
and which are not.”).
26. I had some early experience with the Federal Parole Commission in this regard, having
litigated while in law school the court-ordered release of a federal offender because the Commission’s
decision to not grant parole was palpably arbitrary and capricious. See Hearn v. Nelson, 496 F. Supp.
1111 (D. Conn. 1980).
27. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364–68 (1989).
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heavily restricting judicial discretion, and (2) abolish parole. The
animating precepts were to (1) eliminate “unwarranted” disparities in
sentencing between like offenders committing like crimes, and (2)
establish transparent “truth in sentencing”: the numerical sentence imposed
at the beginning would be the number of years or months that an offender
29
actually served.
The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) generated the 1987
30
Federal Sentencing Guidelines that are one focus of this Symposium.
The 1984 Congress gave the Sentencing Commission a three-year
31
gestation period in which to develop the guidelines —but in 1986, while
the guidelines were still unpublished, a new Congress was elected.
Driven in part by a more “tough on crime” orientation, and in part by
what was perceived as a crack cocaine violence epidemic of the mid-1980s,
this Congress had an even more severe conception of appropriate criminal
sentencing, and “mandatory minimum” criminal sentencing statutes were
32
quickly enacted. The pendulum had now come full circle: under the new
33
statutes, addressing what were perceived as very serious crimes, lengthy
mandatory sentences would be required, without parole or any other
possibility of release before expiration, simply upon conviction of the

28. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1988).
29. That is, with the exception of credits for “good time served,” which is another aspect of
criminal sentencing that has been long accepted and vigorously advocated for by the authorities who
have the difficult job of supervising prison inmate populations. Especially with parole eliminated,
prison authorities demanded that some kind of credit for “good behavior” be retained. See S. Rep. No.
98-225, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3236, 1983 WL 25404. Without some kind of
“carrot” for good behavior, which could be taken away if a prisoner behaved badly, prison authorities
feared they would lose all incentive for good behavior of any kind. See id.
30. Hon. Charles R. Breyer, Keynote Address, 66 Hastings L.J. 1525, 1529 (2015).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 historical and statutory notes: effective and applicability provisions (2014)
(stating the three-year deadline for development of guidelines).
32. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the
Federal Criminal Justice System ch. 2 (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_02.pdf
(detailing the history of the 1986 mandatory minimum sentencing statutes); see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a),
841(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2010).
33. The shift toward mandatory minimums and rising fears of a crack cocaine epidemic were
pushed into overdrive by the ultra-high profile, powder cocaine overdose-induced death of college
basketball star Len Bias. In the wake of Bias’s death, Congress adopted an increasingly aggressive and
vocal “tough on crime” stance, and the House Judiciary Committee drafted and passed new drug
sentencing laws on an expedited schedule—specifically, in one week’s time. H.R. 5394, 99th Cong. (2d
Sess. 1986); H.R. Rep. No. 99-845, at pt. 1 (1986); Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug
Prohibition Politics and Reform, 40 Vill. L. Rev. 383, 408 (1995) (describing how no committee
hearings were held in order to move bills swiftly); U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to
Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 117 (1995), http://www.ussc.gov/
crack/ chap5-8.pdf (describing lack of legislative history in passage of 1986 law). Indeed, the legislative
history of this period reveals no hearings, debate, or study preceding the adoption of these provisions.
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34

defined crime. The Federal Sentencing Commission has repeatedly
expressed its opposition to mandatory minimum sentences, as plainly
35
inconsistent with even the SRA’s discretion-limiting sentencing philosophy.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, hardly an ultra-liberal, and Justice Stephen
Breyer, one of the architects of the Sentencing Guidelines, have also so
36
opined, as have many other experienced federal judges. Indeed, given
37
their enactment of undefined indeterminate sentencing ranges, one
imagines that the progressive Framers of 1790 would agree.
1. The Contemporary Desire for Sentencing Reduction Mechanisms
This brief history of criminal sentencing brings us back to the current
moment, and Santos’s suggestive Essay. Why not have a regime that
provides “a mechanism that would allow defendants to work toward
increasing levels of liberty”—including early release, I presume—“through
38
merit?” And why not have a mechanism for “a formal review that could
39
include release?” I want to briefly expand, and expound, on both ideas,
which I think raise different issues. One involves the concept of
establishing a system of “merit” by which offenders could “earn” privileges
and release. Here, we hear echoes of many others, both current and
40
ancient. The second concept—establishing a system of review for
determining when merit deserves additional privileges or release—

34. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841. “Three strikes” legislation is another version of mandatory
minimum sentencing—unforgivingly lengthy imprisonment sentences imposed on any offender with
two prior qualifying convictions, no matter what the circumstances or offender’s characteristics. Again,
after the 2008 budget crisis hit California, the people of California voted to establish sentencing
reduction mechanisms for now-costly three strikes sentences. See Aviram, supra note 8, at 138–44.
35. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum
Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (1991), http://www.ussc.gov/news/
congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/special-report-congress.
36. See Jess Bravin, Two Supreme Court Justices Say Criminal-Justice System Isn’t Working;
Justice Breyer Says Mandatory Minimum Sentences Are “a Terrible Idea,” Wall St. J. (Mar. 24, 2015,
7:46 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/two-supreme-court-justices-say-criminal-justice-system-isntworking-1427197613; Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association
Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/viewspeech/sp_08-09-03; Letter from the Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, U.S. Dist. Court
Judge, to Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 17, 2013), available at
http://news.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Judge-Bell-Chairman-Leahy-mandatory-minimums.pdf;
Lynne Marek, Circuit Judge Asks for Loosening of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Legal
Intelligencer, Sept. 14, 2009, at 4; Matt Apuzzo, Judge Attacks Disparity in Cocaine Sentencing: Far
More Jail Time for Crack Crimes, Boston Globe (Nov. 15, 2006), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/
washington/articles/2006/11/15/judge_attacks_disparity_in_cocaine_sentencing/.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 12–15.
38. Santos, supra note 2, at 1557.
39. Id.
40. Santos highlights a system of reforms championed by one Alexander Maconochie in a
nineteenth-century Australian island penal colony. See id. at 1561. In this system, prisoners could earn
“gradual increases in liberty” through merit-based achievements. Id. at 1561-62.
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presents different questions, not so much of “what” as of “who” and
“when.”
2. Establishing “Merit-Based” Sentencing Reduction Opportunities
Certainly others have expounded on the concept of “merit” sentencing
reductions—indeed, this is perhaps the original foundation of parole as
developed in the 1900s: early release when a prisoner appears to be
“reformed” and no longer a danger to society. Thus, longtime practitioner
and professor Margaret Love recently published a report on the “Second
Look Roundtable” discussion of the American Bar Association’s
41
Commission on Effective Criminal Sanctions. The idea of enacting a
mechanism for “midcourse correction of a sentence lawfully imposed” is
42
a centerpiece of these discussions, and I would leave interested readers
to the account provided there. Much of the discussion focused on the
43
ALI’s Model Penal Code (“MPC”) revision project. In 2011, the ALI
44
adopted three proposals, suggesting legislative “principles” for establishing
45
mechanisms of sentence-reduction consideration. I will refer to those
proposals as a foil for the following thoughts.

II. The “What”: What Factors Should Permit a Sentencing
Reduction?
Interestingly, the MPC proposals divide the “what” into two very
different sections, apparently based on the answer to the “when.” Thus,
section 305.7 would permit a sentencing reduction for various specific
factors, (including “other compelling reasons”) at any time during an
imprisonment sentence. Section 305.6, meanwhile, would permit
46
consideration of release for any reason, but only after fifteen years of a
sentence have been served. Section 305.7 evidently envisions things like
terminal or incapacitating illnesses of the prisoner, or perhaps of a family
member. “Other compelling reasons” are not defined; perhaps this would
41. Margaret Colgate Love, Sentence Reduction Mechanisms in a Determinate Sentencing System:
Report of the Second Look Roundtable, 21 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 211 (2009).
42. Id.
43. Model Penal Code §§ 305.1, 305.6–305.7, reprinted in Model Penal Code: Sentencing
(Preliminary Draft No. 10, Sept. 3, 2014) (on file with author).
44. Because the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) has no legal force unless adopted by a legislature or
other authoritative body, everything it adopts is really just a “proposal.” Thus, the distinction
announced in MPC § 305.6 (“does not recommend a specific legislative scheme” but “instead” just
“principles”) seems a bit artificial.
45. See Model Penal Code § 305.1, reprinted in Model Penal Code: Sentencing (Preliminary
Draft No. 10, Sept. 3, 2014) (on file with author) (“Good-Time Reductions”); id. § 305.6
(“Modification of Long-Term Prison Sentences; Principles for Legislation”); id. § 305.7 (“Modification
of Prison Sentences in Circumstances of Advanced Age, Physical or Mental Infirmity, Exigent Family
Circumstances, or Other Compelling Reasons”).
46. See, e.g., id. § 305.6 (if “the purposes of sentencing . . . would be better served by a modified
sentence”).
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include the prisoner who saves the lives of guards or others in a prison fire,
or undertakes in other heroic actions. One could easily imagine “compelling
circumstances” overlapping with the “sentencing purposes” rationale of
section 305.6—thereby making the fifteen-year minimum limit of section
305.6 somewhat arbitrary, or at least vaguely patrolled.
But my basic comment here is that the MPC’s proposals do not
expressly specify educational achievements like Santos’s while in prison
47
as a basis for early release. The good-time provision of section 305.1
refers to “educational programs,” but only for “satisfactory participation.”
Educational and other “merit” achievements, like Santos’s, should be
expressly specified.
Moreover, the MPC proposals do not recommend any rules directing
prison authorities to facilitate, rather than obstruct, such educational
programs for in-custody offenders. They should. Achievements like Santos’s
should be encouraged and rewarded (absent other countervailing factors),
expressly and without a fifteen-year minimum limitation.
Of course, the criteria for what constitutes “merit” and how it is to be
measured need to be published before any such system can succeed. The
criteria should be as specific as possible, for the benefit of the prisoner
(and her advocate) as well as the decisionmakers. Yet, like MPC section
305.7 (“other compelling reasons”), any such criteria should also have
some kind of general provision for accommodating merit requests outside
the envisioned specific criteria (for example, “the prisoner discovered a
cure for cancer”). And the goal of such criteria must be kept in mind. It is
not merely to reward for something achieved in prison; it is, as Santos
discusses, to give the prisoner something to shoot for, something to strive
48
for and to work to achieve, while in prison. This means that a prisoner
who won the Pulitzer Prize while in prison for a book she wrote before
49
arrest would presumably not merit a sentencing reduction.
Of course, difficult decisions must be made about what should
constitute educational “merit” as opposed to just “participation,” and, as
in all reward systems, precautions should be taken to avoid “gaming” the
system with meritless online educational credits or other standardless
programs. It may be that the ALI’s 2011 proposals were all that that
large and diverse body could achieve. One hopes that legislatures will
seriously study the concepts and add as much specific detail as possible.
Regardless, it is a sea-shift in current thinking that legitimate political and
50
legislative actors are coming to see value in the idea.
47. See id. §§ 305.6, 305.
48. See Santos, supra note 2, at 1563–66.
49. Arguments can be imagined, of course, on the other side. Welcome to the joy of trying to
write specifics to capture general ideas.
50. See, e.g., Alison Lawrence, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Cutting
Corrections Costs: Earned Time Policies for State Prisoners 1 (2009), http://www.ncsl.org/
documents/cj/Earned_time_report.pdf (detailing that in at least twenty-one states, inmates can earn

I1 - Little_15 (HAMILTON) (Do Not Delete)

August 2015]

MERIT-BASED SENTENCING REDUCTIONS

8/27/2015 9:13 PM

1545

III. The “When” and “Who” of Post-Sentencing Sentence Review
Even if the concept of a merit-based sentencing reduction system is
accepted—despite widespread academic endorsement, it is not clear that
States have accepted it yet—it leaves at least two large questions to be
answered: when, and by who? The following Parts address these questions.
A. Timing
The “when” needs to balance the desire to imprison no longer than
necessary against the administrative costs of constant or repetitive
applications for sentence reductions. Moreover, sufficient time needs to
have elapsed in the service of a sentence, so that an offender can
legitimately claim to having accomplished some “merit” achievement that
deserves a sentence reduction. Two general directions seem possible.
Either a set time could be established (for example, after five years or
51
after half the service of the sentence ), with a period of repose then to
follow (for example, may not be reviewed again for three, or five, or
whatever, years); or, a merit review could be triggered by the prisoner’s
own motion. For example, something like “a prisoner may apply for merit
reduction after three years; but in the event reduction is denied, the
52
prisoner may not reapply for three more years.”
Here I think the MPC proposal could use amendment. Serving a
minimum of fifteen years as provided by section 305.6 of the MPC seems
too long. Further, the MPC does not provide for any “waiting period” of
repose after an application for reduction has been denied. Meanwhile,
section 305.7 (“other compelling reasons”) does not have any minimum
time period. It seems to me that only one section is needed, not two, and
that after some minimum period that is not too long (three or five years), a
sentencing reduction system should be driven by a prisoner’s own
application, rather than by “notice” from the “department of corrections,”
as required by section 305.7(1).

time off their sentences by participating in or completing educational courses; in at least thirty-one
states, merit-based “earned time” incentives are available).
51. The MPC proposal apparently could not be invoked until fifteen years of imprisonment has
passed—thereby eliminating many potential reductions (for example, any sentence of less than sixteen
years). Model Penal Code § 305.6. Other than perhaps “political” acceptability, the rationale for such
a lengthy triggering time is obscure. The MPC proposal would allow an earlier application for
“extraordinary and compelling circumstances.” Model Penal Code § 305.7. But that seems too
narrow and extraordinary. If fifty-five percent of inmates achieve a college degree in the first five
years—and thus not “extraordinary”—ought they all not be included in, at least, a merit-based review?
52. The MPC proposal apparently would permit only one application for “changed
circumstances” reductions. Model Penal Code § 305.6. This simply seems like a bad idea—
administrative convenience being valued over the philosophical rationale for such reductions.
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B. Who Decides
On this question, sections 305.6 and 305.7 of the MPC come down
solidly on the side of a “judicial decisionmaker,” and I firmly agree. But
interestingly, when I proposed the idea to a panel of four excellent U.S.
53
district judges at this Symposium, they appeared to uniformly reject it.
The question of who should decide when a prisoner qualifies for a
sentencing reduction will, inevitably, be fraught with the uncertainties of
the ultimate question: Who, really, can tell if a prisoner is sincere in her
54
achievements? Who, really, can tell if a prisoner remains a danger to
society, regardless of achievements? Initially, the ALI apparently
discussed a number of possibilities: a panel of retired judges; a panel of
“administrative judges”; or an executive-appointed sentencing commission
55
or parole board.
But the ALI finally adopted a “judicial decisionmaker” as its
answer. This, on balance, makes sense. The reluctance of sentencing
judges is understandable: they do not want or need more work, and they
may sincerely believe that after the passage of a number of years, they do
56
not remember much about any particular offender or offense. These
concerns may well be accurate. But in the end, my rationale boils down
to “someone has to do it, and judges are the best of the alternatives, all
of which are inevitably imperfect.”
First, even if memory dims, the original sentencing judge will be
more familiar with the offender and the crime than any other potential
decisionmaker. At least at the time of the original sentencing, that judge
studied both the crime and the offender in order to impose a sentence.
And second, frankly, judges are on the whole more practiced, and (we
hope) more careful and talented in making difficult judgments about
sensitive matters based on less-than-perfect information. It is true that a
discretionary sentence reduction system would inevitably allow some of
the “law without order” variability in judicial decisionmaking to creep
57
back into the system. But presumably rules and guidelines more precise

53. The Judicial Perspective at the Hastings Law Journal Symposium: Federal Sentencing Reform
(Feb. 13, 2015).
54. Cf. Richard S. Frase, Second Look Provisions in the Proposed Model Penal Code Revisions,
21 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 194, 195 (2009) (“inmates (and perhaps some staff) have a strong incentive to
deceive the parole board”).
55. Id. at 198–99.
56. Although in my experience, such judicial claims are over-modest. Most judges can recall a
remarkable number of their past criminal cases. Judges routinely say that sending offenders to jail is
“the most difficult part of the job.” If so, then memory of those cases is unsurprising.
57. Less than one might expect, however, as Judge Breyer’s Keynote Address indicates. Breyer,
supra note 28 (noting that since Booker, which made the federal sentencing guidelines “advisory”
rather than mandatory, a very large percentage of offenders are still sentenced within the
recommended guideline range).
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than existed in 1970 would be part of a well-considered sentencing
reduction system.
It is also true that some judges will retire or die, and their
replacements, with no special knowledge about the matter, will have to
be relied upon. Moreover, it is true that the human weaknesses and
fallibilities of human judges, that always provide room for critique of
judicial decisionmaking, will not be absent. But these are dangers in our
human system that we must always guard against; a merit-based sentencing
reduction regime will be no more, or less, free of such issues than any
other aspect of our imperfect world. Again, judges are on balance
better—not perfect.
In addition, judges on the whole carry a number of institutional
advantages over other actors, such as executive-appointed officials or
retired judges. First is their familiarity with the particular offense and the
offender. Even years later, they can be reminded of the facts by
transcripts, recordings, and copies of pleadings. Second, judgeships in the
U.S. legal system tend to come with some prestige. This means both that
they tend to attract a talented group, and that they carry a sense of public
responsibility and scrutiny not found as prevalently in other justice-system
actors. Yes, the flaws of politically elected judgeships persist, although
states as well as federal districts are increasingly implementing merit58
based judicial selection systems. But again, mine is a “comparison among
the imperfect” kind of rationale. On balance, I think judges are better.
Third, virtually all judges are protected from immediate removal by
terms of office or, in the case of federal judges, life tenure. I am a fan of
life tenure, in general, for federal judges; and even its critics advocate
59
lengthy judicial terms. Such terms insulate judges, to some extent, from
the pressures that might result from criminal sentencing reductions. And
to some extent, those pressures are not illegitimate, but will serve to limit
60
the scope of sentencing reductions to truly deserving inmates.
Of course, the impact on judicial workload of any merit-based
sentencing reduction system must be assessed and the dangers protected
58. See John Schwartz, Effort Begun to End Voting for Judges, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2009, at A12;
James Sample et al., The Brennan Center for Justice, The New Politics of Judicial Elections
2000–2009: Decade of Change (2010).
59. See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure
Reconsidered, in Reforming the Court: Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices 48–56 (Roger C.
Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) (endorsing eighteen-year staggered terms through
constitutional amendment); Sanford Levinson, Contempt of Court: The Most Important
“Contemporary Challenge to Judging,” 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 339, 341 (1992) (advocating single,
nonrenewable terms of eighteen years); L.A. Powe, Jr., Old People and Good Behavior, 12 Const.
Comment. 195, 197 (1995) (suggesting nonrenewable eighteen-year terms); Saikrishna B. Prakash,
America’s Aristocracy, 109 Yale L.J. 541, 570–73 (1999) (reviewing Mark Tushnet, Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts (1999)) (recommending term limits).
60. Judith Resnik, Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 72 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 657 (1999).
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against. This is true of any proposal that will add to the judicial workload.
But there is an interesting historical parallel, now largely forgotten, in the
federal system: the existence, until the enactment of the Sentencing
61
Guidelines in 1987, of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), which
granted discretion to any federal sentencing judge to reduce (or correct)
62
a sentence within 120 days of its imposition. The rule was abolished
63
once the goal of “truth in sentencing” became embedded. But when
Rule 35(b) was in existence, it did not generate overwhelming workload
64
for federal judges. Once clear criteria for merit-based sentencing
reductions are in place, judges should be able to quickly separate the
65
potentially valid from the frivolous. And, of course, legislative authorities
should always be mindful of the workload of judicial actors, and design
and fund a system that does not allow justice to fail for want of resources.

Conclusion
I hope the foregoing has provided food for thought, and not
distraction from reading Santos’s fascinating Essay. My overarching
point is that there is legitimate and increasing support for the ideas that
Santos advances, in his layman’s terms, and he has made a valuable
contribution to our literature. Beyond that, my view is that judges, and
not “lesser” legal actors, should be the ones to act as decisionmakers in a
system of merit-based sentencing reductions, once such a system is
developed as thoughtfully and as specifically as possible. And there ought
not be a lengthy “mandatory minimum” of time served before application
for reduction can be made. From that point on, as Justice Holmes so
66
famously suggested, experience will be our teacher. And the pendulum
will undoubtedly continue to swing, until we get it right.

61. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (prior to 1987 amendment).
62. Kate Stith, Two Fronts for Sentencing Reform, 20 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 343, 343 (2008); Jack B.
Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth
Cardozo Lecture, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1224–25 (2008); Bruce J. Winick, Redefining the Role of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining and Sentencing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive
Law Model, 5 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 1034, 1054 (1999); Joanna M. Huang, Note, Correcting
Mandatory Injustice: Judicial Recommendation of Executive Clemency, 60 Duke L.J. 131, 134–35
(2010).
63. See 5 Orfield’s Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules § 35:6 (2014).
64. See generally B. Carole Hoffman, Note, Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Balancing the Interests Underlying Sentence Reduction, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 283 (1983)
(examining among other things whether a court should retain jurisdiction under Rule 35(b) after 120
days).
65. Section 305.6(4) of the MPC recommends this: “procedures for the screening and dismissal of
applications that are unmeritorious.” Model Penal Code § 305.6(4).
66. “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.” O.W. Holmes, Jr., The
Common Law 1 (1881).

